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Multiple studies have demonstrated age-related deficits in source memory (SM) 
where older adults perform worse on SM tasks than younger adults (e.g., Dodson & 
Schacter, 2001; Johnson et al, 1995; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). In contrast, 
metamemory research has demonstrated that age-related deficits are far from consistently 
demonstrated, leading to a general consensus that young and older adults' performances 
on most metamemory tasks are comparable (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). The research 
presented here focused primarily on an attempt to bridge these two literatures in a 
meaningful way. The contributions were two-fold: an investigation of the viability of a 
metacognitive judgment for SM: the judgment of source learning (JOSL), and a 
simultaneous investigation of the relationship of age and ‘monitoring’ in source memory 
and metacognition. In the first experiment, young participants (18-25 years of age) were 
asked to predict (using JOSLs) whether they would be able to discriminate between 
pictures that were presented to them during study, images of words they generated during 
study, or words they never studied in a later memory test. Participants made either 
immediate or delayed JOSLs (on a 0-100 scale) for each item presented during the study 
phase. Experiment 2 was a cross-sectional study comparing young and old adults (60-80 
years of age) using a modified version of the previous task. In both experiments, 
intraindividual correlations of JOSLs with SM (gammas) indicated that delayed JOSLs 
were accurate predictors of future SM performance. There were no effects of age on 
gamma correlations of JOSLs with SM. Based on these results, although SM showed an 






Reality and Source Monitoring 
Johnson and Raye’s (1981) reality monitoring framework (RMF) focused on how 
people discriminate between information that is externally derived versus what is 
internally generated. As part of a larger source monitoring framework (SMF: Johnson, 
Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), numerous studies have branched off to shed light on the 
human ability to decide where the information, knowledge, or beliefs they possess 
actually originated. A basic tenet of how people actually carry out making source 
discriminations involves ‘monitoring’. Monitoring processes in source discriminations 
refer to a set of processes used to generate evidence regarding source. Johnson and 
colleagues distinguished source monitoring and reality monitoring from each other by 
pointing out that the type of discrimination being made, whether between a real or 
imagined event (reality monitoring) or a wider range of sources (e.g., different speakers, 
contextual details for source monitoring) signals what type of monitoring one is 
discussing. Given a very basic interpretation of this distinction, it is safe to assume that a 
reality monitoring discrimination still falls under that of source since a person is still 
making a decision between the origins of the information, i.e. whether information has an 
internal or external basis. According to the SMF, similarity between sources (Ferguson, 
Hashtroudi, & Johnson, 1992), emotional arousal (Mather et al, 2006), and a person’s 
imaging abilities (Johnson, Raye, Wang, & Taylor, 1979), are factors that can impact the 
accuracy of source judgments. 
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The general consensus is that, most often, source judgments are based on 
heuristics (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009), which can be problematic and give rise to biases 
that can negatively impact the accuracy of source discriminations. Research has shown 
that people tend to rely on familiarity much more than recollection when making source 
discriminations (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). During retrieval of events, Mitchell and 
Johnson (2000) argued that one can experience “…general feelings of familiarity or 
strength to memory for specific features…” (p. 180). In reality monitoring, reliance on 
perceptual cues and heuristic processing to make reality monitoring decisions (Johnson et 
al., 1988; McGinnis & Roberts, 1996) instead of a more deliberate examination of the 
information before making the discrimination leads to decision biases. Kelly and 
colleagues (2002) investigated the ‘bias towards real,’ in which participants were more 
likely under uncertainty to incorrectly attribute internally derived memories to externally 
derived sources. This bias was ameliorated when participants were given a demanding 
task during study that hampered their ability to pay close attention to source details of the 
stimuli. Johnson and Raye (1981) argued that the reality monitoring processes involved 
in discriminating the origin, whether it is internal or external, depends on task constraints 
and the nature of the information; therefore, whether the same biases will manifest across 
reality monitoring tasks remains an open question. 
Age-related Deficits in Source/Reality Monitoring 
The debate in the literature as to whether there is a larger age-related difference in 
memory performance for ‘context’ information (e.g., source, temporal, location) over 
‘content’ information (e.g., recall of words, targets, prose) has concluded that there is a 
larger deficit for older adults for context information (e.g., Bornstein & LeCompte, 1995; 
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McIntyre & Craik, 1987; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008; Spencer & Raz, 1994; 1995; but 
see also Siedlecki, Salthouse, & Berish, 2005), with the caveat that the magnitude of the 
context-based deficit may by task dependent (Onyper, Hoyer, & Verhaeghen, in prep).  
Spencer and Raz’s (1994) meta-analysis found the largest age-related differences on tasks 
where participants had to determine whether actions were performed, imagined, or 
watched. This distinction was especially important for this dissertation because age-
related deficits were likely given the reality monitoring task that was used. 
Several studies point to an age-related deficiency in monitoring processes as the 
basis for the age-related deficit in source memory (Johnson, De Leonardis, Hashtroudi, & 
Ferguson, 1995). This is likely in large part to older adults’ reliance on more on heuristic 
based processes such as familiarity and gist in memory tasks rather than recollection 
(e.g., Dehon & Brédart, 2004; Hashtroudi, Chrosniak, & Johnson, 1989). This has proved 
problematic especially in false memory paradigms, where effective source monitoring 
has been implicated as a remedy for older adults’ increased propensity for false alarms 
(e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2002). Dodson and Schacter (2001; 2002) showed older adults 
to be more susceptible to source retrieval and monitoring errors, but also showed that the 
use of a distinctiveness heuristic helps to reduce false alarm rates for source recognition 
tests. In their work, Dodson and Schacter have shown that older adults do not 
spontaneously engage in strategic processes to make source judgments unless specifically 
instructed to do so. According to Dodson and Schacter (2002), the distinctiveness 
heuristic refers to a strategic process where people reject items or information based on 
expectations about how vivid they expect their memories to be for actual items they 
studied. Encoding based on distinctiveness, as well as a retrieval search that seeks more 
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recollective detail makes the source discrimination more resistant to false alarms (i.e. 
identifying new items as old). Use of the distinctiveness heuristic also reduced age 
differences in source monitoring accuracy. By attending to distinctive item features at 
encoding and then searching for those features at retrieval, older adults were able to 
reduce what Dodson, Bawa, and Slotnick (2007) referred to as ‘illusory recollections’ 
which they argued accounts for a large proportion of the increase in source memory 
deficits in older adults.  In the aforementioned studies, asking older adults to attend to 
and monitor information in a manner they do not spontaneously implement led to the 
exertion of metacognitive control to improve performance.  
It should be noted that not all source memory findings that show an age-related 
deficit are interpreted as monitoring deficits. Recent work by Luo and Craik (2009) 
supported the idea that source memory is impaired because older adults are more 
challenged than younger adults when the need to implement strategic control over 
retrieval arises. Like previous work, manipulating attention to perceptual details reduced 
the age-related deficit in source memory, but a distinction between performance on a high 
specificity judgment (remembering whether an item was presented as a photo or drawing) 
and a low specificity judgment (remembering whether an item was presented as any 
image or just a word) persisted. Simply, even with a task to orient participants to 
perceptual characteristics of the items and longer presentation times, older adults were 
encoding information in a shallower way than younger adults. This behavior led to lower 
memory performance.  Their account suggests that this deficit arises from an overall 
‘reduced resources hypothesis’ of aging (Craik & Byrd, 1982), where older adults are 
engaging in shallow encoding because of a lack of processing resources which then led to 
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deficient binding of specific details from the encoding phase in their experiments. The 
reduced resources were not specific to encoding either. They also went on to argue that 
also at retrieval, control -- which is critical to accessing highly specific detail, is also 
impaired due to age-related reductions in processing resources. 
In the context of this dissertation, an important first step was to frame how the 
idea of monitoring is used in the reality monitoring/source monitoring frameworks – 
distinguishing it from what ‘monitoring’ is in the metamemory literature – and to focus 
on designing experiments that would incorporate these processes for measurement. This 
was especially important when the variable of age was added to the research question. In 
the case of reality monitoring, accuracy was defined by whether the source discrimination 
is correct. The argument was that if the monitoring process is carried out correctly, then 
the attribution of an event to either the internal or external source origin would be correct. 
This is not the same way monitoring accuracy has been conceptualized in metamemory 
theory (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1990), which is discussed below. 
Metamemory: Monitoring and Control 
Metamemory typically refers to a person’s cognitions about his or her own 
memory and is defined as one’s ability to reflect on or monitor memory processes 
(Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Metamemory theory draws a sharp distinction between 
monitoring and control processes (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). Metacognitive monitoring 
refers only to observations of the cognitive system by a meta-level process (Nelson & 
Narens, 1990). Dunlosky and Metcalfe (2009) explained that, “…metacognitive control is 
exerted whenever the meta-level modifies the object-level…you must monitor those 
object-level acts to influence the ongoing activity at the object-level” (p. 5). 
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Metacognitive monitoring can take place at several instances in the memory task setting. 
In this way, monitoring is distinct from action, although accurate monitoring enables 
effective control. 
Koriat (2000) discussed how there was much more to remembering than just 
retrieving a piece of information.  When remembering is effortful, there are several 
processes that one must engage in: preliminary monitoring and choosing of a strategy; 
specifying the initial context of the memory search; accessing partial information and 
zooming in on a memory target; probing one’s memory; regulating the retrieval process; 
and, regulating of memory reporting.  Research into these types of phenomena typically 
involved the use and evaluation of metacognitive judgments. In the simplest terms, the 
individual must engage in monitoring and control processes to reflect on and evaluate the 
information that is in memory in order to make a judgment about it. 
Dunlosky and Metcalfe (2009) defined a metacognitive judgment as, “any 
reflection or judgment made upon an internal representation such as memory” (p. 145). 
The judgment of learning (JOL) is a metacognitive judgment that predicts the ability to 
remember future information (Dunlosky & Nelson; 1994). The accuracy of JOLs can be 
influenced by many factors such as the cues that are accessible at the time of judgment 
(Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001; Koriat, 1997) or when the judgments are made (Kelemen & 
Weaver; 1997; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1994). Koriat showed 
that intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic properties of cues influence the accuracy of JOLs 
differentially.  
A recent meta-analysis by Rhodes and Tauber (2011), which included data from 
Kelemen and Weaver (1997), Nelson and Dunlosky (1991), and Thiede and Dunlosky 
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(1994), compared the relative accuracy of immediate versus delayed JOLs. A sizeable 
effect (g = 0.93) indicated that by delaying the JOL, relative accuracy was significantly 
increased (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the 
‘delayed JOL effect’. The delayed JOL effect centers on the idea that delaying the timing 
of the judgment increases the relative accuracy of JOLs because delayed JOLs are more 
likely based on retrieval cues/processes than immediate JOLs. Relative accuracy is 
typically assessed by correlating predictions with memory outcomes (also called 
resolution). When JOLs were immediate –solicited directly after study of each item– they 
were less accurate predictors of memory outcomes than when JOLs were delayed. The 
theoretical explanations for the delayed JOL effect all included assumptions that 
participants monitored outcomes of retrieval processes in order to formulate the delayed 
JOL (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, p. 100). 
In the literature, the term ‘source judgment’ has referred to the source 
discriminations, modality judgments (e.g., Kelley, Jacoby, & Hollingshed), as well as 
confidence judgments about the accuracy of source discriminations (Mitchell, Johnson, & 
Mather, 2003). As a kind of source judgment, reality monitoring discriminations are 
made as a participant is trying to recall and evaluate a specific aspect of the episodic 
memory—whether the information came from an external or an internal source. 
Theoretically, source memory is inferred. People use a variety of cues, attributions, and 
heuristics to retrieve source information more so than when retrieving the memory itself. 
Providing a predictive metacognitive judgment about one’s future ability to remember a 
source, in theory, takes the evaluations of related cues and attributions one step further.  
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Conceivably, people could represent their confidence in the source information 
they retrieve during the time of the judgment, their confidence in the strategy they use for 
retrieval, and their confidence about the effectiveness of future applications of the 
retrieval and monitoring strategies, with a JOL for source information. Depending on 
their evaluation, they could choose to continue relying on their current task behavior or to 
change it. Metacognitive theory would argue that source monitoring actually is a complex 
process mixing monitoring and control. The studies conducted sought to extend the realm 
of source memory findings to what has already been discovered about other types of 
predictive metacognitive judgments such as JOLs. 
Age-related Deficits in Metacognition 
 Unlike the studies that focused on age-related deficits in source memory, many 
studies of age differences in monitoring from a metacognitive perspective supported the 
idea of spared memory monitoring as one ages (see Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000 for a 
review). Hertzog and Hultsch (2000) provided a categorization of metacognitions, 
namely: a) knowledge about cognition and cognitive functions, b) the monitoring of the 
current state of the cognitive system, and c) beliefs about cognition (including beliefs 
about aging and cognition and beliefs about one's own cognition). One way 
metacognitive accuracy is typically assessed is by correlating judgments with subsequent 
memory outcomes, usually a Goodman-Kruskal gamma (Nelson, 1984). It is referred to 
as resolution and is a measure of how well participants discriminate between items they 
don’t remember and items they do remember by assigning lower judgments or higher 
judgments accordingly. 
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Numerous studies have shown that for most metacognitive judgments, where 
monitoring is assumed to play a critical role, age-related equivalence in monitoring 
accuracy is typically found (e.g., for JOLs: Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; 
Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1997). It is important to note that there are findings where an age-
related deficit is seen for a particular metacognitive judgment, i.e., episodic feeling-of-
knowing judgments (FOKs: Souchay et al., 2004), but there is counter-evidence that this 
deficit may be task specific and possibly an artifact of underlying memory strength 
(Hertzog, Dunlosky, & Sinclair, 2010). Even when age-related differences are seen in 
memory monitoring in the metamemory literature, the deficit could not be characterized 
as generalized.  
Understanding the effects of age on metamemory is not restricted to just 
monitoring. Studies have shown mixed evidence for age-related differences in 
metacognitive control, which in some cases is directly affected by metacognitive 
monitoring. Naveh-Benjamin, Brav, and Levy (2007) provided evidence to support the 
idea that compared to younger adults; older adults were less likely to self-initiate use of 
effective strategies when studying new material. Souchay and Insigrini (2004) 
demonstrated that older adults did not use monitoring as effectively as younger adults to 
allocate study time in a memory task. While Miles and Stine-Morrow (2004) found age-
related differences in how study time was allocated as represented by the correlation 
between JOLs and time spent on study, Stine-Morrow and colleagues (2006) did not find 
the same deficit. It may be the case that older adults were less likely to initiate 
metamemory processes, but when healthy older adults were introduced to or reminded of 
strategies they were able to implement them and improve memory monitoring (updating 
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knowledge of effective strategies) and metacognitive control (allocating study time more 
efficiently). 
To summarize, there seems to be a largely accepted idea that age-related deficits 
exist in reality monitoring or source discrimination, alongside a largely accepted notion 
of no age-related deficits in monitoring encoding and retrieval processes in metamemory 
research. The distinction between monitoring that is typically studied in metamemory 
research (e.g., monitoring represented by simple JOL resolution or study time allocation) 
and the monitoring processes referred to by Johnson and colleagues (e.g., monitoring 
needed to make a source discrimination) could reflect a distinction in the level of 
complexity in the monitoring processes being assessed. JOLs (and other metacognitive 
judgments) could represent judgments based on simpler monitoring processes, whereas 
source monitoring involves monitoring the output of metamemory control and monitoring 
processes. Mitchell, Johnson, and Mather (2002) referred to this complex process as a 
‘gating’ procedure one engages in when trying to separate and extract memory details 
specific to source.  In the former case, monitoring to form a JOL or to modify study 
behavior may be less susceptible to error, in the latter case, monitoring the by-products of 
the ‘gating’ procedure may be more susceptible if not carried out in a very systematic and 
deliberate fashion (which older adults tend not to do). The question then becomes 
whether it is necessary to think of monitoring in these different lines of literature as 
distinctly different processes or whether it is possible to identify shared characteristics of 
both kinds of monitoring.  
Previous research from within the source monitoring framework has sought to 
characterize aspects of source memory in terms of metamemory. Johnson et al. (1993) 
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discussed the use of ‘systematic’ source judgments, whereby one retrieves and judges the 
importance of the details accessed in the source monitoring process. Later, Mitchell, 
Johnson, and Mather (2003) talked about ‘source judgments’ as confidence judgments 
about a source discrimination. Is it then possible to assess monitoring as discussed in the 
SMF and metacognitive monitoring as it is conceptualized in metamemory in an 
experiment and talk about the effects of one on the other?  
Previous Research on Metacognitive Judgments and Source Memory 
This dissertation represented an attempt to explicitly measure metacognitions 
about source memory. The fundamental concept was that instead of predicting memory 
for the target item (as in a JOL), individuals predicted whether they would be able to 
retrieve the source of the target information with a judgment of source learning (JOSL). 
There has already been some research focused on this predictive judgment of source 
memory (Kelley, Carroll, & Mazzoni, 2002; Lafferty, 2001; Sinclair, 2007). In previous 
work, JOSLs were called simply judgments of source (JOSs) and most often were 
conceptualized as predictive ratings of participants’ confidence in their future source 
memory for a particular item. Sometimes JOSs were also used to refer to the source 
discrimination itself. I chose to refer to the predictive judgments in this work as JOSLs to 
avoid confusion with other interpretations of the JOS acronym. JOSLs are prospective 
judgments (like JOLs) about future source recall, rather than retrospective judgments 
about accuracy of item retrieval (like retrospective source confidence judgments about 
source accuracy: SCJs).   
Considering the cue-utilization perspective as applied to JOLs (Koriat, 1997), 
JOSLs were assumed to capture the outcomes of source monitoring processes, the cues 
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that were accessible at the time of the judgment, and the information a participant 
believed would be accessible in the future. Carroll and colleagues were able to show that 
participants predicted better memory for real over imagined events, but found that JOSLs 
were not predictive of source recall (Carroll et al., 1999), or accurate reality monitoring 
(Kelly et al., 2002). In an unpublished master’s thesis, Lafferty (2001) found inconsistent 
relationships between the JOSL and subsequent source memory. Lafferty was able to 
show reliable resolution between immediate JOSLs and source memory performance 
(gamma = 0.58) in one experiment where participants had to discriminate between items 
presented by either a male or female voice, but was unable to replicate this finding for 
other materials. In another unpublished master’s thesis, Sinclair (2007) conducted several 
studies looking at the relationship between delayed JOSLs and subsequent memory 
performance for picture or spoken targets in a list of paired associates (e.g., APPLE-
ROBOT, where the target ROBOT was presented as either a picture or spoken aloud to 
participants). A reliable relationship between source and JOSLs was not observed in the 
findings reported in Sinclair’s work, although JOSLs correlated significantly with paired 
associate recall. 
Studies finding no consistent predictive validity of JOSLs have nevertheless 
uncovered some interesting phenomena. Carroll and Mazzoni (2002) showed that even 
though JOSLs did not correlate significantly with source memory performance outcomes, 
people did scale their JOSLs in some conditions to show their belief that real events 
would be remembered more than imagined events. Lafferty (2001) showed a significant 
relationship between immediate JOSLs and subsequent source discriminations for 
male/female presented items. Sinclair (2007) found that SCJs significantly correlated 
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with source memory performance positively for picture targets, but negatively with sound 
targets. The reasons for the inconsistencies in the relationship between metacognitive 
judgments and source memory have been attributed to several factors: unfamiliar task 
context (Kelly et al., 2002); presence of other metacognitive judgments (like JOLs) that 
may have influenced the predictive judgment for source (Kelly et al., 2002; Sinclair, 
2007); overshadowing of the source task by a concurrent item or associate memory task 
(Lafferty, 2001; Sinclair, 2007). It could be the case that either valid cues were not 
available, or that available cues were not accessed at the time of the JOSL. Indirect 
evidence for these arguments can be found in Sinclair (2007) where JOSLs correlated 
significantly with associative recognition—correlations of comparable magnitude to 
those between JOLs and associative recognition, indicating an ‘overshadowing’ or 
‘contamination’ of cues available that were diagnostic for item memory, but not for 
source. Specifically for JOSLs, these inaccurate judgments possibly meant that the cues 
people attended to when making these predictive metacognitive judgments about their 
source memory were not diagnostic of source memory. 
Even though participants were not able to accurately predict their source memory 
performance consistently, they were able to accurately monitor source memory 
performance under certain conditions. Source confidence judgments (SCJs) about source 
memory performance outcomes provided another opportunity to examine the nature of 
the relationship between source memory and metacognitive judgments. Specifically, 
(SCJs) correlated significantly with previous source memory performance. An open 
question was whether a predictive judgment, like the JOSL, was less accurate than a 
retrospective judgment, like the SCJ. Another idea was that age-related deficits may be 
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seen in one metacognitive judgment but not the other. Such dissociations could mean 
that, for source memory, age-related differences in metacognitive accuracy are sensitive 
to the timing and kind of metacognitive judgment being investigated. 
Until now, previous work investigating age-related differences in JOSL resolution 
was limited to Sinclair’s (2007) study. There is much evidence indicating an age-related 
deficit in source monitoring and utilization of control processes to make accurate source 
discriminations (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). An open question was whether an age-
related difference would be uncovered for JOSL resolution, despite the evidence of age-
invariance in JOL resolution. Findings from Sinclair’s work showed that JOSLs did not 
correlate with future source memory performance for neither young nor older adults. This 
made investigating age-related effects impossible. These issues were once again 
investigated in this dissertation.  
Experiments 
The two experiments in this dissertation addressed four main questions of interest. 
The first question was, could individuals differentiate accurately between self-generated 
and presented stimuli (i.e. engage in accurate reality monitoring)? Related to this question 
was whether or not older adults could perform this task and how would their level of 
performance compared to that of younger adults. The second question was, could 
individuals accurately predict their memory performance within modality (images) but 
across reality monitoring boundaries (internal versus externally derived information) 
using judgments of source learning (JOSLs)? Based on previous research, support for this 
outcome was slim to non-existent. Once again, whether older adults could be as accurate 
as younger adults was an important and related issue investigated. The third and fourth 
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questions were specific to the metacognitive judgments used: did metacognitive accuracy 
depend on the type of judgment (JOSL versus source retrospective confidence [CJs]) or 
simply on the timing of judgments (immediate versus delayed)? 
Experiment 1 included younger adult participants because there were several 
methodological and experiment design questions I wanted to investigate before extending 
the study to include older adults. The source memory task was designed in a way to make 
it more salient over the item memory task by specifically informing participants through 
instruction that the memory tests would focus directly on the source discrimination. 
Essentially, participants were oriented to focus on remembering whether the source of 
images was externally or internally derived (presented images or generated images). 
Secondly, I investigated whether immediate or delayed predictions (i.e. JOSLs) were 
better suited for predicting source memory, employing both source recall and source 
recognition memory assessments. Participants were asked to make predictions about their 
source memory either immediately following each item, or in a delayed judgment block. 
Because distinctiveness and accessibility to detail was of interest, I manipulated the 
‘generate’ instructions across conditions of participants in an attempt to elicit categories 
of items with significantly different levels of perceptual detail. Specifically, participants 
were either instructed, in the ‘generate line’ condition, to generate images like the line 
drawings presented by the experiment or in the ‘generate real’ condition, to generate 
images of items, as they would see them in real life.  Retrospective source CJs were also 
collected in the experiments and accuracy of these judgments was assessed with a gamma 
correlation of source memory performance with the subsequent CJ for each item. 
Participants were asked to give ratings about their memory performance following each 
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item of the source recall and recognition tests. Finally, metacognitive accuracy between 
JOSLs (a forecasting judgment) and SCJs (a retrospective judgment) was investigated.  
By employing a design that was specifically tuned to the encoding and retrieval of 
source information, the validity of participants’ JOSLs was improved. JOSLs have not 
been shown to have above chance accuracy in previous work (probably because of task 
overshadowing, cue contamination, etc). The experiment design addressed these issues. A 
fundamental assumption that influenced the task design was that JOSLs would be based 
largely on the accessibility of perceptual details and the ease of accessing those details at 
the time of judgment. Specifically, by changing the item memory task from a paired 
associate word list to an item list shifted the participant’s focus on encoding a word-word 
association to encoding a word-source association. Secondly, instructing participants that 
the tests would focus primarily on the source discrimination boosted the salience of the 
source discrimination task over the item memory task. Additionally, it was suggested that 
a good strategy for later distinguishing old from new items would be to focus on source 
details. Finally, by phrasing the JOSL to orient participants to predicting their ability to 
make the source discrimination, rather than as a prediction of whether they would be able 
to remember an item, resulted in accurate JOSLs in the delayed conditions. These design 
implementations were proposed as a way to ensure that the JOSL would be based on cues 
diagnostic of source memory rather than other cues that were present in previous research 
(e.g., Sinclair, 2007). 
Borrowing from previous work, SCJs were included to provide an opportunity to 
see if individuals were aware of their memory performance and whether they would 
adjust confidence accordingly when they made correct or incorrect source 
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discriminations. Also a metacognitive judgment, SCJs provided a unique opportunity to 
compare relationships between prediction and retrospective judgments as they related to 
source memory performance. As discussed earlier, SCJs correlated with source memory 
for specific materials so including them once again to assess whether they were accurate 
in this experiment design was of interest. Including SCJs also allowed for an 
investigation into whether high confidence to incorrect discriminations played a role in 
reducing metacognitive accuracy. 
Source recall and source recognition tasks were included to determine if the level 
of age-related deficits seen in source recognition would differ from the level seen in 
source recall as would be suggested by previous research (e.g., Onyper et al., in prep). It 
should be noted that this finding is reversed from what is typically found in item memory 
literature, i.e., source recognition deficits are larger than source recall deficits. Research 
by Cook, Marsh, and Hicks (1997) showed that accurate source memory can occur even 
when items are not recalled. This would lead to predicting that source recognition would 
still be good even if source recall were deficient. Thierry and colleagues (2005) found 
that when both types of source memory tests are used, source recall enhances source 
discriminations for children on a subsequent source recognition task.  
The independent variables in the first experiment were JOSL timing (immediate, 
delayed), instruction condition (generate line, generate real), and item type (presented, 
generated, new). The dependent variables were judgments of source learning (JOSLs), 
item memory, source recall (SRECAL), source recognition (SRECOG), retrospective 
confidence judgments (SCJs), and several gammas (JOSL-SRECAL, JOSL-SRECOG, 
SRECAL-SCJ1, SRECOG-SCJ2, JOSL-SCJ1 and JOSL-SCJ2. The goals of the first 
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experiment were to establish whether JOSLs were significantly predictive of source 
memory outcomes, to assess the relationship between source memory and retrospective 
confidence, to investigate whether timing of the JOSL affected its predictive ability, to 
see if task instructions and/or the modality in which items were studied affected the 
dependent measures in any way, and to investigate whether the relationships between 
JOSLs, source memory performance, and source confidence judgments were influenced 
by the independent variables indicated. 
In experiment 2, a new sample of younger adults was tested along with a sample 
of older adults. The dependent variables of interest were the same as in experiment 1. The 
overarching goal of experiment 2 was to extend the procedures from experiment 1 to an 
age cross-sectional design in an attempt to assess possible age-related effects on the 
dependent measures. Experiment 2 also served in part as an opportunity to investigate 
whether results from experiment 1 could be replicated in a new sample of younger adults 






 A total of 126 younger adults between the ages of 18 and 25 (Mage = 20.2, SD = 
1.75) participated in this study (see Table 1 for further sample characteristics). They were 
recruited from the Georgia Tech volunteer subject pool using Experimetrix. Participants 
chose between compensation of $25 or 2 hours of course extra credit. 
Table 1 Participant Demographics 
Experiment 1 









N 31 31 34 30 
Age (years) 20.5 (1.99) 19.7 (1.36) 20.4 (1.92) 20.2 (1.68) 
Education (years) 15.0 (1.15) 14.87 (0.81) 15.1 (0.90) 15.1 (0.64) 
Female 41% 68% 35% 63% 
Note. Standard deviations of means in parenthesis 
Materials 
JOSL Computer Task 
 The main source monitoring task was programmed in Visual Basic.Net and 
administered on personal computers. The input devices for the computer task were the 
keyboard and mouse, and the monitor resolution was set at 1024 X 768. The stimuli 
included 185 concrete nouns available in simple, black and white, line drawn picture 
format (see Appendix A). Five of the items were used for practice (WHEELBARROW, 
STETHOSCOPE, FISHTANK, PIGGYBANK, UNICYCLE) and the remaining 180 
were used in the main experiment. The picture stimuli were acquired as freeware from 
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the Center for Research in Language – International Picture Naming Project database that 
is maintained by the University of California, San Diego. The names of the pictures were 
also used along with the images to ensure that no differences among word generation for 
the images would occur (Table 2). At the beginning of the program for each participant, 
items were randomly assigned to be presented as a line drawing, as a text word for 
generation, or presented only during test as a new item ‘foil’. This resulted in 60 
presented items, 60 generated items and 60 new items in the experiment. 
Table 2 Word List (Picture Names) 
ARROW CASTLE GLOBE MOUSE RAINBOW STATUE 
BABY CHAIN HAIR NAIL RAZOR STOVE 
BACKPACK CHEESE HAMBURGER NEEDLE RIFLE STRAWBERRY 
BAG CHEST HAY NEST ROAD STROLLER 
BALLOON CHURCH HELMET OCTOPUS ROBOT SUBMARINE 
BANDAID CITY HINGE PACKAGE ROCK SWING 
BANJO CLOCK HOOF PANDA ROCKET TAIL 
BAT COMB HOSE PANTS ROLLERSKATE TANK 
BATHTUB COOKIE JACKET PAPERCLIP ROOF TEAPOT 
BEARD COWBOY JUMPROPE PARROT ROPE TEEPEE 
BELT CRAB KING PEACOCK ROSE TEETH 
BENCH CRACKER KITE PEAR RUG TELESCOPE 
BIRD CRIB KNOT PEAS SALT TENT 
BOAT CROSS LADDER PENGUIN SCARF THUMB 
BOMB CURTAINS LAMP PICTURE SEESAW TIE 
BONE DESERT LEAF PILLAR SHARK TIGER 
BOTTLE DIAPER LETTER PILLOW SHELL TOE 
BOX DRESS LIGHTHOUSE PITCHFORK SHIRT TOILET 
BRA DRILL LION PIZZA SHOVEL TOWEL 
BRIDE DRUM LIZARD PLATE SINK TROPHY 
BRIDGE DUSTPAN LLAMA POOL SKATEBOARD TURKEY 
BROOM EGG LOG POPCORN SKELETON TWEEZER 
BRUSH ELEPHANT MAGNET POPSICLE SKIS VASE 
BUG FAN MAP POT SLIDE VIOLIN 
BUTTER FEATHER MICROPHONE PRESENT SLINGSHOT VOLCANO 
CACTUS FIRE MICROSCOPE PUMPKIN SNAIL WALNUT 
CAMEL FIRETRUCK MIRROR PURSE SPAGHETTI WIG 
CANE FISH MONKEY PUZZLE SPIDER WINDMILL 
CANOE GHOST MOOSE RADIO SQUIRREL WORM 
CAR GLASS MOP RADISH STAIRS ZEBRA 
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 For the source recall task, the word names of the items were presented to 
participants to make the reality monitoring discrimination. In the source recognition task, 
both the name and line drawing for each item was presented for discrimination. For both 
memory tasks, a forced choice test format was used. Participants had to select one of the 
answer choices in order to move on to the next item. 
 
Paper Tasks 
 In addition, standard paper and pencil measures were administered to assess 
sample characteristics. These paper and pencil measures included a demographic 
questionnaire (personal data sheet: PDS), the Advanced Vocabulary Test – a recognition 
vocabulary test used to assess verbal ability (AVT: Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 
1976), the Pattern Comparison and Letter Comparison perceptual speed measures (PC 
and LC: Salthouse & Babcock, 1991), and measures of participant imaging ability: the 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ: Johnson et al., 1988) and the Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ: Marks, 1973). 
Design 
 The design of this first experiment was a 2 (timing of the JOSL: either immediate 
or delayed) X 2 (type of image generate instruction: ‘generate line’ images or ‘generate 
real’ images) X 2 (item type: presented or generated) mixed factorial. JOSL timing and 
generate instruction conditions were manipulated between subjects while item type was a 
within subject variable. 
Procedure 
 Participants provided informed consent at the beginning of the experiment. After 
this was received, they completed the PDS, AVT, PC and LC paper and pencil measures. 
Following completion of these paper and pencil measures, participants began the main 
computer task of the experiment. 
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 In the first portion of the task, participants were given extensive instructions as to 
what they would be required to do to complete the task successfully. They were informed 
that they were attempting to learn the items for a later memory test that would focus on 
how they studied the item. They were told that they would be studying two kinds of 
items, images that were presented to them on the computer screen (Figure 1) and items 
where they would have to study by generating a mental image of the item.  
 
 
Figure 1. The ‘presented item’ study instruction example 
 Depending on the condition in which the participant was assigned, they either 
received instructions orienting them that when asked to generate an image they should, 
“Imagine a simple, black and white, line drawing of the item, like the images presented 
on the computer” (‘generate line’ instructions), or to “Imagine the item as it would appear 
in the real world” (‘generate real’ instructions). They were provided with three 
experimenter-designed examples for their respective instruction condition (WAFFLE, 
WOLF, ICECREAM), where either black and white line drawings were shown or a color 
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photo of each example was shown (Figure 2). Participants were then given the 
opportunity to ask for further clarification if needed. 
 
Figure 2. The ‘generate real’ study instruction example 
 Participants in all conditions received instructions on the respective judgments 
they would be making, which included the JOSL as well as confidence judgments (CJs) 
following each memory trial for the items. In the immediate JOSL conditions, 
participants were informed that following the presentation of each item (whether a 
presented line drawing, or generated image), they would be required to provide a 
judgment rating following each item to the following prompt: “How likely are you to 
remember whether the item shown here was an image PRESENTED to you or one that 
you GENERATED an image of yourself?” They made their judgment on a 0 to 100 scale 
where, 0 indicated that they “definitely will not remember” and 100 indicated “definitely 
will remember”. In the delayed JOSL conditions, participants were told that this same 
judgment prompt for the JOSLs would be collected in a subsequent block following 
presentation of all the items. 
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 All participants were instructed that during the memory tests, a confidence 
judgment (CJ) for each item will be solicited thusly: “How confident are you that the 
answer you just provided was correct?” They made this judgment on a 0 to 100 scale, 
where 0 indicated that they are “not at all confident” and 100 indicated that they are 
“completely confident” that the answer they previously provided on the trial was 
accurate. 
 Following a brief (5 item) practice trial to orient participants to the study task and 
provide opportunities for participants to ask the experimenter questions, the main study 
phase began. During this phase participants were presented 120 items, one at a time, in 
the center of the screen. Sixty items were presented as black and white line drawings with 
their text name below the picture (Figure 3), and 60 items were presented as text only.  
 
Figure 3. A ‘presented’ study item 
Participants were instructed to generate an image of the word presented (Figure 4). All 
120 study items were presented randomly to participants and picture and text items were 
randomly interspersed in the study phase of the experiment. 
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Figure 4. A ‘generate’ study item 
 In the immediate JOSL conditions, following the presentation of each item, 
participants were asked to make a JOSL before continuing on to the next item. In the 
delayed JOSL conditions, participants made all JOSLs in a judgment block following 
presentation of all 120 study items. JOSLs in both the immediate and delayed conditions 
were solicited using only the text format of each item (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. JOSL prompt 
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 After the completion of the study and judgment phases, participants completed a 
short 5 minute filler task where they were asked to match patterns in a separate computer 
task. Following the pattern matching filler task, participants began the test phase. 
 In the first memory task, participants completed a source recall task where they 
were presented with the text version of the item (Figure 6). They typed in whether they 
studied the item originally as a picture that was presented to them on the computer (P), 
one that they generated (G), or an item that they never studied (N). All 120 studied items 
were randomly presented along with 60 new foils randomly interspersed. After each 
source recall trial, participants gave a retrospective confidence rating to indicate their 
confidence in their answer for the trial. 
 
 
Figure 6. Source recall item 
 In the second memory task, participants completed a source recognition task 
where they were presented with both the black and white line drawn version of the item 
as well as the text only version (Figure 7). They had to choose which way they originally 
studied each item by clicking on the circle beneath the version of the item they believe 
 27 
they studied previously. After each trial, participants provided a confidence judgment 
(CJ) to rate their confidence in the answer they provided for each trial. Only the 120 
originally studied items were used in this task. 
 
Figure 7. Source recognition item 
 Following the completion of this task, participants completed both versions of the 
MCQ and the VVIQ (Appendix B). Finally, participants were debriefed and the session 
concluded. 
Data Analyses and Results 
 Effects are identified as significant at the p < 0.05 level for all subsequent 
analyses. The value italicized in parenthesis following the F statistic is the calculated 
Cohen’s d effect size statistic. For Cohen’s d, a “small” effect ranges from 0.20-0.30, 
“medium” effects range near 0.50, and effects are considered “large” when d is greater 
than 0.80 (Cohen, 1988). For interactions, a modified Cohen’s d (d*) was calculated as an 
effect size measure. Marginal means are reported for significant effects and interactions 
where applicable. Values in parenthesis following means are standard errors.  
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Paper Data  
 Data from paper and pencil measures were digitally consolidated and relevant 
means are reported below. In Table 3, mean performance data on the perceptual speed 
and vocabulary measures are reported. Across conditions, the groups were comparable on 
all paper data variables (need F stats for LC, PC, and AVT). 
Table 3 Perceptual Speed and Vocabulary Test Means (SD)  
Experiment 1 

























0.56 (0.12) 0.62 (0.13) 0.60 
(0.12) 
 
In Table 4, the imaging ability scores are reported for all imaging measures. The 
percentages in the table are the proportion of participants in each condition who were 
classified as high imagers. Imaging ability as measured by the VVIQ and MCQ was 
comparable across conditions. 
 
Table 4 Imaging Ability Questionnaires Means (SDs) 
Experiment 1 
 Immediate Delayed 
 Generate Line Generate Real Generate Line Generate Real 
VVIQ* 2.5 (0.86) 2.5 (0.99) 2.9 (1.0) 2.5 (1.1) 
High Imagers 66% 63% 38% 55% 
MCQ-Real** 5.4 (0.89) 5.5 (0.67) 5.3 (0.61) 5.6 (0.55) 
High Imagers 51% 55% 48% 55% 
MCQ-Dream** 4.1 (0.98) 3.8 (0.92) 3.8 (1.0) 3.6 (0.98) 
High Imagers 62% 55% 45% 32% 






 The independent variables of importance were the timing of the JOSL (immediate 
vs. delayed), and the type of ‘generate’ instruction participants were told to implement 
(generate line vs. generate real). The dependent variables evaluated were JOSLs, 
SRECAL, source recall confidence (SCJ1), SRECOG, and source recognition confidence 
(SCJ2). Additionally, Goodman-Kruskal gammas were generated and analyzed for JOSLs 
with SRECAL, JOSLs with SRECOG, retrospective CJs with their respective source 
recall (SCJ1) and source recognition trials (SCJ2), and lastly for JOSLs and CJs (both 
types). Gender was included as a grouping variable in the results reported because 
significant gender-related effects for memory performance were uncovered during data 
analysis. Analyses were carried out using a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (Gender X JOSL timing X 
Instruction type X Item type) model in repeated measures ANOVAs. There were no 
significant effects of instruction type; therefore, this variable was dropped from most of 
the reported results and subsequent discussion. 
Mean Judgments of Source Learning (JOSLs) 
 JOSLs were aggregated for each participant and then analyzed. A main effect of 
JOSL timing was found, F(1, 118) = 11.26 (0.60), where participants in the delayed 
JOSL condition produced JOSL means higher than participants in the immediate 
condition (Figure 8). An effect of delay was expected, though the direction of the effect 
was not. It was argued that at the time of the immediate judgment, participants would be 
misled into making very high JOSLs based on the salient perceptual trace of the item they 
just studied. Conversely, participants in the delayed JOSL conditions were expected to 
downgrade their JOSLs because their task experience up to that point (presentation of the 
entire list, fatigue, etc) would have influenced their judgments. Whether items were 
presented as drawings or generated did not seem to have an effect on the mean JOSLs. I 
proposed that details from salient perceptual traces of the items would drive the JOSL. If 
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this were the case, I expected to see an interaction of item type with delay. The results did 
not show this effect, F(1, 118) = 0.67. Mean JOSLs for generated items MIMMEDIATE = 
67.4 (2.36), MDELAYED = 79.4 (2.58), and presented items MIMMEDIATE = 69.4 (2.31), 
MDELAYED = 79.9 (2.27) are plotted in Figure 8. In summary, participants in the delayed 
JOSL conditions predicted higher reality monitoring performance than those in the 
immediate conditions. There was no distinction made between the types of items, where 
participants in both delays predicted comparable memory performance for both generated 
and presented images. 
 
Figure 8. JOSL means by JOSL timing and item type 
In general, participants were highly confident in their future memory performance. A 
frequency distribution of the JOSLs sorted into six bins (0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-













































Figure 9. Frequencies of JOSL ratings (predictions of source memory performance) 
Mean Source Recall Accuracy 
 For the source recall task data, the mean proportions of correct source recall for 
participants were analyzed. There were three item categories in this analysis because I 
included memory performance for ‘new’ items along with ‘presented’ and ‘generated’ 
item types. Women performed significantly better than men on this task, F(1, 118) = 8.73 
(0.53), MMEN = 0.78 (0.02), MWOMEN = 0.87 (0.02). There were also significant effects of 
JOSL timing, F(1, 118) = 6.41(0.45) and item type, F(2, 118) = 22.08 (0.57) where 
source recall was higher for participants in the immediate JOSL condition [MIMMEDIATE = 
0.86 (0.02), MDELAYED = 0.79 (0.02)], and source recall for generated items was highest 
of all the item types [MPRESENTED = 0.79 (0.02), MGENERATED = 0.89 (0.01), MNEW = 0.79 
(0.02)] (Figure 10).  
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Figure 10. Source recall by JOSL timing and item type 
 Analyzing the recall data according to an old vs. new item type categorization 
indicated that participants were much better at attributing the correct source to old items 
(presented + generated) than new items, F(1, 122) = 4.92 (0.41), MOLD = 0.84 (0.01), 
MNEW = 0.79 (0.02). Participants had slightly more accurate memory for items they 
previously studied than for items presented as new foils during the source recall task. 
Mean Source Recognition Accuracy 
 Source recognition performance was analyzed using mean proportions of 
correctly sourced items. Like source recall performance, women outperformed men, F(1, 
118) = 6.08  (0.44), MMEN = 0.88 (0.01), MWOMEN = 0.92 (0.01). In contrast to what was 
predicted, there were significant effects of delay and item type on source recognition 
(Figure 11). There was a significant interaction of delay and item type, F(1, 118) = 14.01 
(d* = 0.71 for presented items, d* = 0.06 for generated items) where participants in the 
immediate conditions outperformed those in the delayed conditions on source recognition 
memory, and were also significantly better at recognizing presented items. The 

















recognition for presented items in the delayed conditions, MIMMEDIATE-PRESENTED = 0.91 
(0.02), MDELAYED-PRESENTED = 0.79 (0.02), MIMMEDIATE-GENERATED = 0.96 (0.01), 
MDELAYED-GENERATED = 0.95 (0.01). 
 
Figure 11 Source recognition by JOSL timing and item type 
 I predicted that participants would perform better on the source recognition task 
when compared to source recall. The results supported this prediction, MSRECAL = 74.0 
(0.06), MSRECOG = 96.7 (0.02). The source recognition task should have been easier for 
participants given that the study episode was reinstated by re-presenting the studied items 
in their previously studied formats, and there were no ‘new’ foils to misattribute. Finally, 
these results replicated previous findings that showed source recall boosting later source 
recognition (Thierry et al, 2005).  
Mean Confidence 
 The retrospective confidence ratings for source recall were aggregated and the 
means were analyzed. There was a significant interaction of JOSL timing and item type 
(note: item type was defined in this analysis as old versus new), F(1, 122) = 5.41 (d* = 








































were less confident in their ability to correctly identify new items as NEW, but the 
difference in confidence between old and new items was even more pronounced in the 
delayed conditions, MIMMEDIATE-NEW = 78.1 (2.8), MDELAYED-NEW = 66.8 (2.7), 
MIMMEDIATE-OLD = 89.9 (1.8), MDELAYED-OLD = 88.4 (1.8). SCJs for source recognition 
showed a significant effect of delay where participants in the immediate condition 
showed higher mean level confidence in their source recognition memory performance 
F(1, 118) = 12.17 (0.62), MIMMEDIATE = 94.3 (1.3), MDELAYED = 87.7 (1.3). 
 
Figure 12. Source recall confidence judgments by JOSL timing and item type (New-Old) 
Metacognitive Accuracy: JOSL and Memory Performance Gammas 
 What were the best conditions under which JOSLs were most predictive or 
‘accurate’? Resolution is represented by gamma correlations of JOSLs and the two 
memory performance outcomes (source recall and source recognition), which were 
computed and analyzed using the model already specified in a repeated measures 
ANOVA. 
 Analysis of the judgments of source learning and source recall (JOSL-SRECAL) 
gammas showed two main effects: an effect of JOSL timing, F(1, 111) = 76.43 (1.56), 
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and item type, F(1, 111) = 7.86 (0.35). In the delayed JOSL conditions, not only were 
gamma correlations higher than in the immediate conditions, but they were significantly 
different from zero. Means are reported in Table 5. Thus participants could accurately 
predict their source recall, but only when judgments were delayed. This ‘delayed JOSL 
effect’ is consistent with the delayed JOL phenomenon already demonstrated in the 
metacognitive judgment literature. Gamma correlations for presented items were higher 
than generated items, indicating better resolution for images presented on screen during 
study.  
Table 5 Recall Gamma Means (SE) 
Experiment 1 
 Presented Generated 
Immediate 0.09 (0.05) 0.03 (0.07) 
Delayed 0.74 (0.05) 0.45 (0.07) 
 
Analysis of gamma correlations of JOSLs with source recognition (JOSL-SRECOG) 
yielded the delayed JOSL effect for presented items, MIMMEDIATE-PRESENTED = 0.16 (0.06), 
MDELAYED-PRESENTED = 0.76 (0.06), but not for generated items, MIMMEDIATE-GENERATED = 
0.16 (0.10), MDELAYED-GENERATED = 0.15 (0.10). The interaction of JOSL timing and item 
type was significant, F(1, 101) = 15.06 (d* for presented items = 0.76, d* for generated 
items = 0.02) (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Source recognition gammas by JOSL timing and item type 
Metacognitive Accuracy: Memory Performance and SCJs 
 The second measure of metacognitive accuracy --the SCJ gamma correlations 
with their respective memory measures-- allowed the evaluation of whether participants 
were differentially aware of items they correctly sourced versus items they did not. For 
source recall, only a main effect of item type was found, F(1, 114) = 6.41 (0.30), where 
participants were more accurate monitoring their memory performance for presented 
items compared to generated items (Table 6). The SRECOG-SCJ2 gamma correlations 
showed the same pattern (Table 6), with the effect of item type significant, F(1, 103) = 
5.35 (0.26). 
Table 6 Confidence Gamma Means (SE) 
Experiment 1 
 Presented Generated 
SRECAL 0.77 (0.04) 0.61 (0.06) 

































Two Metacognitive Ratings: JOSLs and SCJs 
 The relationship between JOSLs and SCJs was also evaluated using gamma 
correlations. These two classes of metacognitive judgments were related for participants 
across items. When analyzing the correlations between JOSLs and the source recall 
confidence gammas, a significant interaction of JOSL timing and item type, F(1, 113) = 
13.34 (d* for presented items = 1.26, d* for generated items = 0.76) was found. The 
marginal means were: MIMMEDIATE-PRESENTED = 0.08 (0.04), MDELAYED-PRESENTED = 0.73 
(0.04) and MIMMEDIATE-GENERATED = 0.20 (0.05), MDELAYED-GENERATED = 0.59 (0.05).  The 
gamma correlations between JOSLs and source recognition confidence judgments 
showed a similar effect where the measures showed a more consistent relationship to 
each other in the delayed conditions relative to immediate: MIMMEDIATE = 0.17 (0.04) 
versus MDELAYED = 0.53 (0.04). The significant effect of JOSL timing, F(1, 112) = 38.46 
(1.10), lends evidence to the idea that the details used to make delayed JOSLs and SCJs 
were more consistent with each other than immediate JOSLs. The higher correlations 
between the delayed JOSLs and SCJs corroborate theoretical arguments that delayed 
judgments are largely based on outcomes of retrieval processes at the time the judgment 
is formed. Because SCJs were given after a test trial, where a retrieval attempt has been 
made, those processes should overlap with retrieval processes at the time of the delayed 
JOSL. 
Discussion of Experiment 1 Results 
In evaluation of metacognitive accuracy, I assumed that transfer appropriate 
monitoring and other congruent processes at the time of encoding and retrieval would 
heavily influence the correlation between the judgments and source memory 
performance. A robust delayed JOSL effect added credibility to the argument that 
participants could accurately predict their future memory performance when JOSLs were 
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based on cues that were diagnostic of retrieval ability. This finding parallels the delayed 
JOL effect previously seen in the literature (see Rhodes & Tauber, 2011 for a review). 
Perhaps at the time of the JOSL, participants were evaluating several classes of cues on 
which to base the judgment. What cues they emphasized over others remain an open 
question. In the conditions where JOSLs were accurate, JOSL gammas for generated 
items were consistently lower for both SRECAL and SRECOG. One way to explain this 
effect of item type may be that individuals could have been misled by the salience of 
perceptual detail, or some other misleading cue when making JOSLs. Finding that 
immediate JOSLs did not correlate with subsequent source memory performance could 
mean that individuals were putting more emphasis on the quality of perceptual traces (not 
as diagnostic of retrieval) rather than actual ability to retrieve diagnostic details about the 
item and/or the encoding episode.  
For metacognitive accuracy using the retrospective SCJs, I predicted that 
participants would be able to accurately monitor their test performance and discriminate 
between items they got wrong and items they answered correctly. Presented or generated 
item type did not matter, as confidence was comparable across these types; however, 
mean SRECAL confidence for discriminating new items was significantly lower. The 
gammas were accurate across all conditions, item types, and source memory tasks. Even 
though participants could monitor their source recall performance with significant 
accuracy, they were less sure about their ability to correctly source new items versus old 
items. Perhaps the difference in familiarity between new and old items led to higher 
confidence for items they were exposed to more than once. 
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A lot of the expected outcomes for this first experiment were based on an 
underlying assumption that JOSLs would be heavily influenced by accessible perceptual 
detail. As such, it was expected that participants would demonstrate illusory high 
confidence in the immediate JOSL condition because they would have more salient 
perceptual traces on which to base their judgment. This was not the case. Instead, mean 
JOSLs in the immediate conditions were lower than in the delayed conditions. One 
possible explanation could be that this phenomenon was just an artifact of group 
differences in anchoring of their judgment responses. Also tied to the assumption that 
perceptual detail was going to be an important factor in participant behavior, I anticipated 
that participants in conditions where the instructions should have led them to generate 
images of far richer perceptual detail would show superior memory and prediction. 
Finding no significant effects of instruction type was surprising, but not entirely 
unexplainable. The superior memory performance on generate items across the board 
indicates that just the act of generating images was enough to boost memory for those 
items. An alternative explanation could be that, even though participants were instructed 
to imagine line drawings in the condition which was supposed to result in less detailed 
images, spontaneous generating of more perceptually complex images was not controlled 
or assessed in this experiment. Participants in the different instruction groups may have 
engaged in similar generation strategies even though they were instructed differently. 
Reality monitoring is boosted by differences in the types of detail available to 
make the internal/external source discrimination. I assumed that source memory would be 
boosted by the availability and saliency of perceptual details. Finding that source recall 
and recognition were higher for generated items supported this prediction. Rhodes and 
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Tauber (2011) reported a small, but reliable benefit to memory performance for delayed 
JOL items (g = 0.08). The original argument for source memory performance in the 
delayed conditions to be higher was in line with this effect and rooted in the idea that 
additional retrieval opportunities for participants in the delayed JOSL conditions would 
lead to superior performance. Although higher source memory performance for 
participants in the delayed JOSL conditions was predicted, the results did not follow this 
prediction. Source memory performance was actually higher for participants in the 
immediate conditions. What I did not anticipate was that because the JOSL was not time-
limited, participants in the immediate conditions could have taken extra time during the 
study phase trials to rehearse the items prior to making their judgments. On average, 
participants in the immediate conditions took 469ms longer to make JOSLs than 
participants in the delayed JOSL conditions.  
When comparing levels of source memory performance (SRECAL versus 
SRECOG), I predicted that recognition performance would be higher than recall memory 
performance. Although previous research indicated that source recall is usually better 
than source recognition across studies, very few studies have included both types of tasks 
simultaneously to investigate what effects could arise when both source recall and source 
recognition are measured for the same participants. In one study, Thierry and colleagues 
(2005) showed that source recall actually boosted source recognition so that memory 
performance on source recognition was higher. SRECOG was indeed higher than 
SRECAL across all conditions of experiment 1. 
 The experiment’s design allowed for appraisal of the relationship between JOSLs 
and SCJs. Interestingly, JOSLs and SCJs did correspond to each other in the delayed 
conditions. I have already argued that delayed JOSLs incorporated more retrieval based 
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cues than their immediate counterparts. If SCJs were based largely on similar retrieval 
cues as well, then finding a significant relationship between these judgments makes 
theoretical sense. The greater the consistency between the evidence used to form a JOSL 
and a SCJ, the larger the correlation between these judgments should be.  If a participant 
is able to retrieve significant detail about the target at the time of the judgment, this can 
translate into greater likelihood of retrieving the information at test, and ultimately higher 
confidence at test. 
  In the case of delayed JOSLs, differences between JOSLs for correctly sourced 
items (regardless of test format) related to measures of source memory confidence. In 
work on feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs), even in the absence of successful target 
recall, participants were able to monitor retrieval and accurately predict future 
recognition (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, p. 61). Hertzog, Dunlosky, and Sinclair (2010) also 
reported significant-above chance- gamma correlations between FOKs and confidence 
judgments. These correlations were biggest for correctly recognized items argued to be 
because differences in FOKs, “…align with influences that generate confidence in the 
accuracy of forced choice recognition…” (p. 778). A parallel can be drawn between 
delayed JOSLs and FOKs. Even though (in the case of delayed JOSLs) there was not an 
explicit recall prompt at the time of the judgment, participants could engage in retrieval 
and monitoring of retrieval outcomes. Should participants base JOSLs on cues related to 
retrieval monitoring, this mirrors participant behavior when making FOKs, which ask 




The results from the first experiment were crucial to the design of experiment 2. 
In order to investigate the developmental trajectory of JOSLs, the second experiment was 
a cross-sectional study of younger and older adults.  Based on experiment 1 results, the 
instruction manipulation was dropped. Even though immediate JOSLs were not accurate, 
this feature was retained in the design in order to see whether the delayed JOSL effect 
was also applicable to older adults. The second experiment was conducted to answer the 
specific question of whether age-related deficits in source memory performance also 
extended to age-related deficits in source metacognitive accuracy as measured by JOSL 
and SCJ resolutions. 
Method 
Participants 
 Eighty-three younger adults (MAGE = 19.4, SD = 1.3) and 80 older adults (MAGE = 
68.6, SD = 5.9) participated in this study. Younger adults were recruited from the 
Georgia Tech volunteer subject pool using Experimetrix and were given the choice of 
receiving compensation of $25 or 2 hours of course extra credit. Participation was 
restricted to individuals who had not participated in the first experiment. Older adults 
were recruited through an existing database of participant names and received $35 pay. 
Table 7 Participant Demographics 
Experiment 2 
 Young Adults Older Adults 
 Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed 
N 43 40 40 40 
Age (years) 19.3 (1.48) 19.5(1.27) 70.0 (5.16) 69.3 (6.56) 
Education (years) 14.2 (1.00) 14.5 (0.78) 16.4 (2.17) 16.4 (2.34) 
Female 70% 55% 52% 57% 
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Note. Standard deviations of means in parenthesis 
Materials, Design, and Procedure 
The same materials from the first experiment were used. The design was the same 
as experiment 1 with the exceptions of the exclusion of instruction conditions and 
addition of age as a grouping variable. All participants received ‘generate real’ 
instructions. Experiment 2’s design was 2 (Gender) X 2 (Age group) X 2 (JOSL timing) 
X 2 (Item type: presented or generated). JOSL timing as manipulated between subjects 
while item type was once again a within subject variable. The procedure was also the 
same as experiment 1. 
Data Analyses and Results 
Paper Data  
 Data from paper and pencil measures were digitally consolidated and relevant 
means are reported below. In Table 8, mean performance data on the perceptual speed 
and vocabulary measures are reported. Consistent with observed norms, younger adults 
outperformed older adults on perceptual speed measures (LC and PC), while older adults 
scored higher on vocabulary (AVT) (Fstats).  
Table 8 Perceptual Speed and Vocabulary Test Means (SD) 
Experiment 2 
 Younger Adults Older Adults 
 Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed 
Letter 
Comparison 
25.1 (4.54) 24.4 (4.11) 17.6 (5.67) 17.7 (4.86) 
Perceptual 
Comparison 
44.4 (6.97) 44.7 (7.13) 31.2 (6.74) 32.0 (7.37) 
Advanced 
Vocabulary Test 
0.54 (0.13) 0.56 (0.12) 0.61 (0.17) 0.60 (0.23) 
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In Table 9, the imaging ability scores are reported for all imaging measures. The 
percentages in the table are the proportion of participants in each condition who were 
classified as high imagers. 
 
Table 9 Imaging Ability Questionnaires Means (SD) 
Experiment 2 
 Younger Adults Older Adults 
 Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed 
VVIQ* 2.5 (0.89) 2.7 (0.92) 2.1 (0.87) 2.0 (1.1) 
High Imagers 58% 51% 57% 52% 
MCQ-Real** 5.4 (1.6) 5.3 (1.7) 5.5 (1.7) 5.5 (1.5) 
High Imagers 51% 56% 53% 57% 
MCQ-
Dream** 
3.6 (1.8) 3.6 (1.9) 3.8 (1.8) 3.4 (1.4) 
High Imagers 49% 54% 60% 40% 
Note. *Ratings closer to 1 indicate highly vivid imagery. **Ratings closer to 7 
indicate more detail. 
 
Computer Task 
 The grouping variables of age and gender and the independent variables of JOSL 
timing and item type were the main focus. The dependent variables collected and 
analyzed were: JOSLs, SRECAL, source recall confidence (SCJ1), SRECOG, and source 
recognition confidence (SCJ2). Additionally, Goodman-Kruskal gammas were once 
again generated and analyzed for JOSL-SRECAL, JOSL-SRECOG, SRECAL-SCJ1, 
SRECOG-SCJ2, and JOSL-SCJ (with SCJs from both recall and recognition).  Analyses 
were carried out using the full 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (Gender X Age group X JOSL timing X 
Item type) model. Statistics referring to younger adults are denoted with a ‘YA’ subscript 
whereas those referring to older adult data are denoted with an ‘OA’ subscript. 
Mean Judgments of Source Learning (JOSLs) 
 JOSLs were aggregated for each participant and then analyzed using a repeated 
measures ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of age, F(1, 156) = 6.26 (0.39), 
MYA = 73.7 (2.11) and MOA = 81.3 (2.14), where older adults predicted higher memory 
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performance by producing higher mean JOSLs than younger adults. This result raised the 
question as to whether this difference was a product of older adult overconfidence, or 
conversely, younger adult under-confidence. As found in experiment 1, a main effect of 
JOSL timing was significant, F(1, 156) = 17.44 (0.65), MIMMEDIATE = 71.2 (2.14) and 
MDELAYED = 83.8 (2.12),where participants in the delayed JOSL condition predicted 
higher memory performance than participants in the immediate condition (Figure 14). 
There was no interaction of age and delay, F(1, 156) = 0.61, indicating that the effect was 
consistent across age groups. There were once again no effects of item type, F(1, 156) = 
3.54 (0.08), MPRESENTED = 78.3 (1.46) and MGENERATED = 76.7 (1.65). Both younger and 
older adults predicted comparable source memory performance across item types in their 
respective conditions.  
  
Figure 14. JOSLs by age group, JOSL timing and item type 
Mean Source Recall Accuracy 
 For the source recall task data, the mean proportion of correct source recall 
(SRECAL) for participants was computed and analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA. 
There was a significant effect of age, F(1, 156) = 11.84 (0.47), which was consistent with 
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= 0.83 (0.02) and MOA = 0.75 (0.02). The JOSL timing effect seen in previous results was 
not significant in this sample, F (1, 156) = 0.53 (0.10). There was a significant main 
effect of item type, F(2, 156) = 3.72, MPRESENTED = 0.77 (0.02), MGENERATED = 0.81 
(0.02), and MNEW = 0.79(0.02). With the exception of older adults in the delayed 
condition, SRECAL was once again highest for generated items (Figure 15). The item 
type effect was most pronounced for younger adults.  
 
Figure 15. Source recall by age group, JOSL timing and item type 
 To address whether older adults were overconfident and younger adults under-
confident in their prediction of source memory performance a difference measure was 
computed between mean JOSLs and mean source recall for each participant (JOSL – 
SRECAL). This difference was analyzed according to the same repeated measures model. 
Results included significant effects of age, JOSL timing, and item type. The age effect, 
F(1, 156) = 33.69 (0.91), indicated that younger adults under-predicted their performance 
whereas older adults were overconfident: MYA = -10.3 (2.2) and MOA = 7.6 (2.2). For the 
JOSL timing effect, F(1, 156) = 22.40 (0.74), participants in the immediate condition 
were under-confident, while those in the delayed condition predicted higher memory 
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item type effect, F(1, 156) = 10.60 (0.27), MPRESENTED = 1.7 (1.7) and MGENERATED = -4.4 
(1.9), indicated that participants were under-confident in their ability to remember 
generated items. 
Mean Source Recognition Accuracy 
 Source recognition performance was computed as the mean proportion correct for 
each individual and analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA. The predicted age-
related effect on source recognition was significant, F(1, 156) = 22.35 (1.3), MYA = 0.91 
(0.01) and MOA = 0.82 (0.01). Once again younger adults outperformed older adults in 
the source memory task. The main effect of item type was also significant, F(1, 156) = 
16.18 (0.63), MPRESENTED = 0.83 (0.01) and MGENERATED = 0.91 (0.01), where generated 
items were sourced more accurately than presented items. This effect was consistent for 
both younger and older adults (Figure 16). JOSL timing did not produce any significant 
effects on source recognition, F(1, 156) = 0.53 (0.11).  Similar to the experiment 1 result, 
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Mean Confidence 
 The mean retrospective confidence ratings for source recall (SCJ1s) were 
analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA. The significant interaction of age and item 
type, F(2, 156) = 3.48 (d* for presented items = 0.01, d* for generated items = 0.03, d* 
for new items = 0.17), indicated that even though both younger and older adults were 
most confident in their source recall for old items (presented and generated), younger 
adults were significantly less confident than older adults in their ability to correctly 
discriminate new items (Table 10). When looking at how mean confidence matched up to 
mean source recall, older adults seemed to be showing consistent overconfidence in their 
memory performance, MRECALLOA = 0.75 (0.02) and MSCJ1OA = 82.4 (1.9), while younger 
adults’ confidence, at least in magnitude, seemed to be in line with their actual 
performance, MRECALLYA = 0.83 (0.02) and MSCJ1YA = 82.3 (1.9). 
 No significant effects on SCJ2s were found for source recognition as all 
individuals exhibited high confidence in their source memory performance across age 
groups, conditions, and item types (Table 10). 
Table 10 Mean (SE) source recall and recognition confidence judgments  
 Experiment 2 
  Younger Adults Older Adults 
  Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed 
Source Recall 
(SCJ1) 
Presented 88.7 (2.5) 85.8 (2.5) 85.7 (2.5) 89.5 (2.5) 
Generated 88.9 (2.5) 87.2 (2.5) 84.3 (2.5) 89.7 (2.5) 




Presented 92.6 (2.0) 89.8 (2.0) 87.8 (2.0) 90.5 (2.0) 
Generated 92.2 (2.0) 90.4 (2.1) 87.5 (2.1) 92.2 (2.1) 
Metacognitive Accuracy: JOSL and Memory Performance Gammas 
 Analysis of the judgments of source learning and source recall (JOSL-SRECAL) 
gammas was conducted using proc mixed procedure in SAS, which allowed every cell of 
available data to be utilized in the analysis. A repeated measures ANOVA approach was 
used. As predicted, there was no effect of age on metacognitive accuracy as measured by 
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the JOSL, F(1, 146) = 1.42 (0.19), MYA = 0.32 (0.04) and MOA = 0.24 (0.05). A robust 
main effect of JOSL timing was observed, F(1, 146) = 52.57 (1.2), where, once again, 
delayed JOSL gammas were predictive of future source recall while immediate JOSL 
gammas were no different than zero, MIMMEDIATE = 0.04 (0.04) and MDELAYED = 0.51 
(0.05). JOSL timing interacted significantly with item type whereby delayed JOSLs 
provided the most accurate prediction for presented items, F(1, 146) = 7.38 (d* for 
presented items = 0.83, d* for generated items = 0.37), MDELAYED-PRESENTED = 0.68 (0.06), 
MDELAYED-GENERATED = 0.34 (0.07), MIMMEDIATE-PRESENTED = 0.03 (0.06), and MIMMEDIATE-
GENERATED = 0.06 (0.07). Both younger and older adults’ in this experiment demonstrated 
the delayed-JOSL effect (Figure 17). This result replicated findings from experiment 1. 
 
Figure 17. Source recall gammas by age group, JOSL timing and item type 
 Analysis of gamma correlations of JOSLs with source recognition revealed an 
interaction of JOSL timing and item type, F(1, 135) = 4.03 (d* for presented items = 
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in the gammas for presented items for both younger and older adults, but only for 
generated items in the young. 
 
Table 11 JOSL and Source Recognition Gamma Means (SE) 
Experiment 2 
 Younger Adults Older Adults 
 Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed 
Presented 0.07 (0.11) 0.61 (0.10) -0.05 (0.11) 0.33 (0.10) 
Generated 0.10 (0.12) 0.30 (0.12) 0.11 (0.11) 0.12 (0.12) 
Metacognitive Accuracy: Memory Performance and CJs 
 The second class of metacognitive judgments analyzed was the SCJ gammas with 
their respective source memory outcomes. For the source recall and SCJ1 correlations, a 
main effect of age was observed, F(1, 150) = 8.90 (0.47) (means in Table 12). Although 
both younger and older adults accurately monitored their SRECAL performance, younger 
adults were better at discriminating between items they got correct and incorrect. The 
SRECOG-SCJ2 gamma analysis uncovered no significant effect of age, F(1, 135) = 0.07. 
The effect of item type was significant, where accuracy was higher for presented items, 
F(1, 135) = 6.72 (0.31) (means in Table 12). 
Table 12 Confidence Gammas (SE) 
Experiment 2 
 Younger Adults Older Adults 
 SRECAL SRECOG SRECAL SRECOG 
Presented 0.76 (0.06) 0.68 (0.07) 0.52 (0.06) 0.56 (0.06) 
Generated 0.65 (0.06) 0.37 (0.1) 0.49 (0.06) 0.45 (0.08) 
 
Discrimination and Bias 
In order to explore the age-related effect seen in the SRECAL-SCJ gammas, 
source recall task data were analyzed using a probit transformation and then bias (C) and 
discrimination (d') measures were computed and analyzed (see Snodgrass & Corwin, 
1988). I wondered if a response bias in older adults that could lead to high confidence 
errors was the reason their confidence gammas were not as accurate as younger adults. 
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For d', values close to 0 indicated chance responding while values of C significantly 
different from 0 in either direction indicated a response bias (Table 13). While both 
groups showed above chance responding (d' = 2.6 for young, 1.6 for old), there was 
evidence for bias, but not in the older adult data. Young adults showed a bias to answer 
generate, which led to an age effect, F(1, 159) = 4.65 (0.31), MYA = -0.31 (0.1) and MOA 
= -0.03 (0.1). While this does not help explain the age-related deficit in the accuracy of 
the SCJs for SRECAL, this finding is interesting because of previous work by Kelly and 
colleagues (2002) that bias should be towards a ‘presented’ or ‘real’ response rather than 
a ‘generated’ or ‘imagined’ response. In the case of these results, it seems that when 
younger adults were faced with uncertainty, they shifted their response characteristics to 
say ‘generate’. 
Table 13 Discrimination (d') and Bias (C) Means (SE) 
Experiment 2 
 Younger Adults Older Adults 
 Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed 
d' 2.5 (0.2) 2.6 (0.2) 1.6 (0.2) 1.5 (0.2) 
C -0.20 (0.1) -0.42 (0.1) -0.04 (0.1) -0.01 (0.1) 
Two Metacognitive Ratings: JOSLs and SCJs 
 The relationship between JOSLs and SCJs was once again evaluated using 
gamma correlations between the two judgments. For SRECAL, the JOSL-SCJ1 
correlation analysis revealed significant effects of both age and JOSL timing. The 
judgments correlated more highly for younger adults than for older adults, F(1, 145) = 
4.46 (0.34), MYA = 0.32 (0.05) and MOA = 0.17 (0.05). The most robust effect was for 
JOSL timing, F(1, 145) = 33.93 (0.94), MIMMEDIATE = 0.04 (0.05) and MDELAYED = 0.45 
(0.05). Once again delayed JOSLs correlated highest with CJs. Both younger and older 
adults showed the delayed JOSL effect (Figure 18).  
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Figure 18. Gamma correlations of JOSL with SCJ1 by age group and JOSL timing 
 In the case of JOSL-SCJ2 gamma correlations, there was a significant interaction 
of JOSL timing and item type, F(1, 137) = 6.44 (d* for presented items = 0.59, d* for 
generated items = 0.28), MIMMEDIATE-PRESENTED = 0.06 (0.06), MDELAYED-PRESENTED = 0.52 
(0.06), MIMMEDIATE-GENERATED = 0.16 (0.06), and MDELAYED-GENERATED = 0.38 (0.06). The 
expected delayed JOSL effect was present, and resolution was best for presented items in 
the delayed condition (Figure 19). 
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Discussion of Experiment 2 Results 
 The focus of this experiment was to investigate whether age-related deficits in 
source memory were also found in source metamemory as assessed with metacognitive 
judgments. Although younger adults showed better source memory performance than 
older adults on both source tasks, JOSL resolution with source recall and source 
recognition showed no age-related deficits. Aligning with the first experiment’s results, 
source memory for generated items, on average, was best. This result was consistent 
across both age groups. Whether just the engaging in generating study behavior or the 
availability of more perceptual detail was enough to make memory for generated items 
superior in this study remains an open question. 
 Based on previous work, I expected to see age-related differences in source 
memory performance in the reality monitoring tasks employed in this experiment 
(Dodson, 2002; Hashtroudi et al, 1989). The open question was whether delayed JOSLs, 
which had been shown to predict future source memory performance in younger adults, 
would show the same predictive accuracy in an older adult sample. Not only did delayed 
JOSLs correlate significantly with future source memory performance in both recall and 
recognition tasks, the gammas were comparable across age groups. Older adults were as 
accurate as younger adults at predicting their future source memory performance using 
JOSLs, even when source memory performance was significantly lower. Both age groups 
replicated the delayed JOSL effect seen in the first experiment and mirrored the delayed 
JOL effect seen in previous work dating back to Nelson and Dunlosky (1991). Both 
groups also showed best resolution for presented items over generated items. 
 While metacognitive accuracy of the predictive measure of source memory failed 
to show age-related effects, the same could not be said for the retrospective measure. 
Specifically, age-related deficits were found in the resolution of confidence judgments 
with source recall outcomes. Both younger and older adults were able to accurately 
monitor their performance on the source memory tasks; however, younger adults were 
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more accurate. Further investigation into the possible causes for this difference revealed 
that although there was an age-related bias to respond ‘generate’, this bias was for 
younger adults, not older adults. Another way to see whether older adults were 
experiencing illusory high confidence would be to look at SCJs for incorrect answers. 
Disproportionate rates of high confidence judgments to errors, in the older adult data, 
would help to explain why confidence resolution with source recall was lowered for older 
adults. A later analysis of this variable revealed the aforementioned pattern. Older adults 
on average were highly confident in source recall errors, MOA = 75.2 (2.4), when 
compared to younger adult confidence, MYA = 59.7 (2.4). This difference was significant, 
F(1, 154) = 20.46 (0.71). 
 The age-related deficit in confidence judgment resolution was not consistent. 
There were no age-related effects with source recognition. To explain possible 
mechanisms behind misrecollections and older adults’ greater propensity to misremember 
and be highly confident in misrecollections, Dodson and Krueger (2006) pointed to an 
age-related reduction in older adults’ abilities to bind and associate features of events, 
and a reliance on familiarity which can be misleading. I posit that a possible explanation 
for discovering an age-related deficit in the source recall task, but not source recognition 
can be found in the ‘misrecollection account’. In the source recognition task, participants 
did not have to generate the candidate items from memory and then make the source 
attribution. If older adults were unable to recollect enough detail to provide good 
candidate answers to choose from, they were not hurt in the recognition task which 
provided the candidates for them. In the source recall task, there was more room for error 
because older adults may not have had enough detail available to them at the time of test, 
or they may have engaged in what Henkel, Johnson, and De Leonardis (1998) referred to 
as miscombinations—combining features across items—which would lead to high 
familiarity and high confidence errors. If the misrecollection account is correct, older 
adults were at a clear disadvantage in the source recall task that was more generative in 
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nature when compared to the source recognition task used in this experiment. Perhaps the 
age-related deficit in source memory performance and confidence judgment resolution 
stemmed from the same impaired recollective and binding processes. 
 Research has shown that even when source memory is comparable between age 
groups, the age-related deficit in confidence still appears. Dodson, Bawa, and Krueger 
(2007) showed that even when matched on source memory performance with younger 
adults, older adults still showed illusory high confidence when incorrectly attributing the 
source of information previously studied. It should be noted that Dodson and colleagues 
only found this age-related deficit when looking at the calibration of confidence 
judgments with source memory. They did not find significant age-related effects when 
they computed a resolution index (gamma). Similarly, Shing and colleagues (2009) 
demonstrated that older adults exhibited disproportionately more instances of high 
confidence to errors when compared to children, teenagers, and young adults in the same 
task. Once again, calibration of confidence judgments with memory outcomes was 
evaluated. Two theoretical accounts for this phenomenon include the misrecollection 
account and age-related declines in associative memory functions, particularly those 
associated with hippocampal functioning. 
 The relationship between JOSLs and SCJs in experiment 2 was largely consistent 
with effects previously reported in experiment 1. Resolution between the two 
metacognitive judgments was strongest for delayed JOSLs in line with the idea that both 
delayed JOSLs and SCJs were based on some similar retrieval processes at the time of 
these judgments. An age effect was seen only for JOSL-SCJ resolution for source recall. 
High confidence to source recall errors for older adults would degrade the relationship 




In the source monitoring and metamemory literatures, monitoring processes are 
simultaneously blamed and credited for age-related effects seen in research on older and 
younger adults. In the former case, impaired monitoring of source information partially 
resulting from an over-reliance on familiarity is said to contribute to age-related deficits 
in source memory performance (Mitchell et al., 2003). In the latter case, spared 
monitoring abilities which inform metacognitive judgments about memory outcomes is 
said to contribute to comparable performance across age groups for metamemory 
performance (Hertzog & Dunloksy, 2011). The main thrust of the work presented here 
was to investigate a potential crossroad to bring ideas about monitoring from the source 
memory literature and ideas about the role of monitoring in the metamemory literature 
together in a meaningful way. In both experiments presented in this dissertation, 
monitoring was a critical component in both the source memory task and the source 
metacognitive judgment. 
The first question of whether individuals could differentiate accurately between 
self-generated and presented stimuli (i.e. engage in accurate reality monitoring) was 
answered with a resounding ‘yes’. Source memory performance overall was substantial in 
both source recall and recognition tasks. Age-related differences in source memory 
performance were consistent with expectations based on previous work. Younger adults 
outperformed older adults on both source memory tasks.  
The second question was whether individuals could accurately predict their 
memory performance within modality (images) but across reality monitoring boundaries 
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(internal versus externally derived information) using judgments of source learning 
(JOSLs). Like most phenomena in our field, the answer starts with, “it depends”. Yes, 
reliable and significant resolution was found for individual predictions of their source 
memory performance in both tasks, but factors such as timing of the metacognitive 
judgment and item characteristics had their unique and sometimes interactive effects. 
Previously, consistent relationships between source memory and source metamemory 
measures proved difficult to find. In both experiments presented, metacognitive accuracy 
of JOSLs was demonstrated for delayed JOSLs, but not for immediate JOSLs. The 
delayed JOSL effect ties together with previous research done which concluded that 
delayed metacognitive judgments proved more accurate than immediate judgments (see 
Rhodes & Tauber, 2011 for a review). 
Thirdly, I was interested in whether metacognitive accuracy for source 
information was judgment dependent, that is, were individuals just as good at predicting 
memory performance using JOSLs as they were at monitoring their performance using 
confidence judgments. Resolution for confidence judgments indicated accuracy across 
studies, and that individuals were able to discriminate between correct and incorrect 
source attributions. However, age-related difference in the accuracy of these retrospective 
judgments may indicate that not all metacognitive judgments are equal. Findings 
presented by several researchers (e.g., Dodson & Krueger, 2006; Jacoby et al., 2010) 
have indicated that retrospective confidence judgments made by older adults were less 
accurate that those made by younger adults. In Experiment 2, older adults showed 
significantly reduced resolution of the source confidence judgments compared to younger 
adults. One could argue that this reduction could be an artifact of overall memory 
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performance, yet recent work by Wong, Cramer, and Gallo (2012), examining whether or 
not age-related deficits in metamemory accuracy as measured by confidence judgments 
could be ameliorated if older and younger adults’ memory performance was matched, 
showed that even when matched, reduced metamemory accuracy was still found.  
Ultimately, I wanted to know if age-related deficits in monitoring would 
simultaneously manifest in impaired source memory performance and impaired 
metamemory accuracy for older adults. What I was found were two dissociations. First, 
although a consistent age-related deficit was found for source recall performance, there 
were no age-related effects in resolution of the delayed JOSL for older and younger 
adults. Second, although there were no age-related deficits in metamemory accuracy as 
measured by the predictive JOSL metacognitive judgment, there were age-related deficits 
in accuracy of the retrospective SCJ metacognitive judgments. 
 A major contribution of this dissertation was the discovery of a consistent, 
predictive metacognitive judgment for source memory. The judgment of source learning 
(JOSL) did predict future source memory outcomes in both source recall and source 
recognition tasks. Like previous findings on judgments of learning (JOLs), the JOSL was 
most accurate when judgments were delayed. This delayed JOSL effect was not only 
consistent with source memory outcomes, it was found in both age groups and across two 
experiments. Although this was not the first time that a relationship was found between 
judgments of this type and memory performance, it was the first time that the relationship 
replicated across experiments. By making the source memory task the salient aspect of 
the study, in this case a reality monitoring discrimination, participants had very clear 
expectations of what information they would be required to remember. I believe that this 
feature of the experiments’ design was critical in ensuring a stable and consistent 
measure.  
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 Many studies have documented the prevalence of an age-related deficit in source 
memory, namely, older adults do consistently worse on source tasks that younger adults, 
yet still show comparable metamonitoring ability. Theorists point to several potential 
explanations of this dissociation. A ‘misrecollection account’ for source material 
proposed by Dodson, Bawa, and Krueger (2007) stated that age-related deficits for source 
information were a result of high-confidence errors older adults make to misrecollected 
or misinformation. Essentially, even if information retrieved is incorrect, older adults 
seem unable to adjust their overall confidence to the wrong information, instead judging 
this information to be just as accurate as correct recollections. Declines in associative or 
binding processes with age (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin et al, 2003) have also been implicated 
in the debate of what is the root cause of age-related deficits in source memory 
performance. Johnson and colleagues call the ‘fly in the ointment’ impaired source 
monitoring. So, what is ‘monitoring’ anyway? Metamemory research has shown that 
older adults seem unimpaired when it comes to monitoring how well they have learned 
information. Kuhlmann and Touron (2011) suggested that while metacognitive 
monitoring is indeed spared in older adults, the ability to utilize the knowledge from 
those monitoring processes may be the culprit for impaired source memory.  
 The results of the experiments in this dissertation showed that finding an age-
related deficit in source memory performance did not necessarily go hand in hand with an 
age-related deficit in the ability to monitor source information in memory. Hinging an 
explanation of age-related deficits in source memory on an impaired source monitoring 
assumption is not sufficient when no age-related differences were found for predictions 
about one’s ability to remember source information. These results supported the idea that 
there are significant differences in the types of source monitoring required to form 
metacognitive judgments versus making a reality monitoring decision. It seems more 
likely that source monitoring is a collection of monitoring processes, and more than 
likely, the ‘monitoring’ required to make judgments like JOSLs and SCJs is qualitatively 
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different than what is needed to make a correct source discrimination. Disentangling the 
monitoring processes was not the goal of this research; however, by identifying an area in 
the source literature where age-related deficits were not present, one can raise the 
question of whether a blanket ‘age-related deficit in monitoring’ explanation is sufficient 










IMAGERY ABILITY QUESTIONNAIRES 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
 
In this task, we will ask you to perform some visualization. We would like you to rate 
each visualized image according to the following scale: 
 
1- Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
2- Clear and reasonably vivid 
3- Moderately clear and vivid 
4- Vague and dim 
5- No image at all, you only ‘know’ that you are thinking of the object 
 
Please CIRCLE the number which reflects your response. 
 
For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not 
with you at present) and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s 
eye. 
 
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders, and body. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. The different colors worn in some familiar clothes 1 2 3 4 5 
 
For items 5-8, visualize a rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that comes before 
your mind’s eye. 
 
5. The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes of lightning. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. A rainbow appears. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
For items 9-12, think of the front of a shop which you often go to. Consider the picture 
that comes before your mind’s eye. 
 
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the 
road. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. A window display including colors, shapes and details of individual 
items for sale. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. You are near the entrance. The color, shape and details of the 
door. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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12. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant 
serves you. Money changes hands. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
For items 13-16, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake. 
Consider the picture that comes before your mind’s eye. 
 
13. The contours of the landscape. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. The color and shape of the trees. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. The color and shape of the lake. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing waves. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Memory Characteristics Questionnaire 
 
Your goal in this task is to think about a real memory of an event and to provide ratings 
on several scales. We will not ask you to describe the memory in detail or reveal anything 
personal. 
 
Think of a recent social occasion—party, dinner, or a gathering of some 
sort that involved more than two people including yourself. 
 
Please provide your ratings below by circling a number on the scale that reflects your 
response. 
 
1. My memory for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   dim           sharp/clear 
 
2. My memory for this event is in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
black & white                entirely color 
 
3. My memory for this event involves visual detail 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none        a lot 
 
4. My memory for this event involves sound 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none         a lot 
 
5. My memory for this event involves smell 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none                   a lot 
 
6. My memory for this event involves touch 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none         a lot 
 
7. My memory for this event involves taste 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none         a lot 
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8. Overall vividness of my memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  vague                very vivid 
 
9. My memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       sketchy        very detailed 
 
10. My memory for the order of events is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       confusing                      comprehensible 
 
11. The story line for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 simple                 complex 
 
12. The story line for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
bizarre                             realistic 
 
13. My memory for the location where the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                   clear/distinct 
 
14. The general setting for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
unfamiliar            familiar 
 
15. The relative spatial arrangement of objects in my memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
16. The relative spatial arrangement of people in my memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
17. My memory for the time when the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
18. My memory for the year the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





19. My memory for the season the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
20. My memory for the day the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
21. My memory for the hour the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
22. The event seems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
short                  long 
 
23. The overall tone of the memory is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
negative           positive 
 
24. In this event I was 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a spectator        a participant 
 
25. At the time, the event seemed like it would have serious implications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   not at all          definitely 
 
26. Looking back, this event did have serious implications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   not at all          definitely 
 
27. I remember how I felt at the time when the event took place 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   not at all          definitely 
 
28. My feelings at that time were 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
negative           positive 
 
29. My feelings at that time were 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





30. As I am remembering now, my feelings are 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not intense         very intense 
 
31. I remember what I thought at the time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all          clearly 
 
32. This memory reveals or says about me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not much       alot 
 
33. Overall, I remember this event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
hardly                          very well 
 
34. I remember events relating to this memory that took place in advance of the event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    not at all          yes, clearly 
 
35. I remember events relating to this memory that took place after the event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    not at all         yes, clearly 
 
36. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
             a great deal of doubt     no doubt whatsoever 
 
37. Since it happened, I have thought about this event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
     not at all           many times 
 
38. Since it happened, I have talked about this event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       not at all               many times 
 
39. About when did this event happen? Check one: 
____ just today 
____yesterday 
____few days ago 
____last week 
____few weeks ago 
____last month 
____few months ago 
____last year 
____longer (if childhood, indicate age) 
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Memory Characteristics Questionnaire 
 
 
Your goal in this task is to think of a memory for an event and to provide ratings on 








Please provide your ratings below by circling a number on the scale that reflects your 
response. 
 
1. My memory for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   dim           sharp/clear 
 
2. My memory for this event is in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
black & white                entirely color 
 
3. My memory for this event involves visual detail 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none        a lot 
 
4. My memory for this event involves sound 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none         a lot 
 
5. My memory for this event involves smell 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none                   a lot 
 
6. My memory for this event involves touch 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none         a lot 
 
7. My memory for this event involves taste 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little or none         a lot 
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8. Overall vividness of my memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  vague                very vivid 
 
9. My memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       sketchy        very detailed 
 
10. My memory for the order of events is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       confusing                      comprehensible 
 
11. The story line for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 simple                 complex 
 
12. The story line for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
bizarre                             realistic 
 
13. My memory for the location where the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                   clear/distinct 
 
14. The general setting for this event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
unfamiliar            familiar 
 
15. The relative spatial arrangement of objects in my memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
16. The relative spatial arrangement of people in my memory for the event is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
17. My memory for the time when the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
18. My memory for the year the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




19. My memory for the season the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
20. My memory for the day the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
21. My memory for the hour the event takes place is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              vague                     clear/distinct 
 
22. The event seems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
short                  long 
 
23. The overall tone of the memory is 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
negative           positive 
 
24. In this event I was 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a spectator        a participant 
 
25. At the time, the event seemed like it would have serious implications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   not at all          definitely 
 
26. Looking back, this event did have serious implications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   not at all          definitely 
 
27. I remember how I felt at the time when the event took place 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   not at all          definitely 
 
28. My feelings at that time were 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
negative           positive 
 
29. My feelings at that time were 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not intense         very intense 
 
30. As I am remembering now, my feelings are 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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not intense         very intense 
 
31. I remember what I thought at the time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all          clearly 
 
32. This memory reveals or says about me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not much       alot 
 
33. Overall, I remember this event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
hardly                          very well 
 
34. I remember events relating to this memory that took place in advance of the event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    not at all          yes, clearly 
 
35. I remember events relating to this memory that took place after the event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    not at all         yes, clearly 
 
36. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
             a great deal of doubt     no doubt whatsoever 
 
37. Since it happened, I have thought about this event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
     not at all           many times 
 
38. Since it happened, I have talked about this event 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       not at all               many times 
 
39. About when did this event happen? Check one: 
____ just today 
____yesterday 
____few days ago 
____last week 
____few weeks ago 
____last month 
____few months ago 
____last year 
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